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The recent growth of regional integration agreements (customs unions and free-trade areas)
has been accompanied by a mounting concern for the health of the multilateral trading
system. Much of this concern stems from the generally accepted view that the current WTO
rules do not provide an adequate set of disciplines on regional arrangements. The EU has
been one of the main driving forces behind the recent growth of regionalism, but its interests
are increasingly affected by regional arrangements formed between other countries. This
paper argues that the lack of clear WTO disciplines on regional arrangements may have
already had adverse consequences for the EU. Given that the EU has declared its support for a
clarification of the rules, the paper tries to identify where its priorities should lie. It is argued
that there should be two such priorities. The first should be to define more precisely what is
meant by an “applicable” tariff. It has never been clear whether this refers to applied tariff
rates or to bound ceilings. Because of this ambiguity, Mexico was able to raise applied tariffs
(within bound ceilings) on imports from the EU and other third countries in response to the
peso crisis, whilst lowering tariffs on her NAFTA partners. Secondly, the EU and other major
WTO players need to address the problem of different rules of origin emerging from the
proliferation of regional arrangements.
*  A previous version of this paper was presented at a DG II seminar on ‘Regional Integration in the World
Economy’ held in Brussels on 23
rd April 1998. I would like to thank André Sapir, for numerous conversations on
this topic, and Ian Fletcher, who acted as discussant at the seminar and provided many helpful suggestions. I am
also grateful to Marco Buti, Hervé Jouanjean and Jan Host Schmidt for comments on previous versions of this
paper.23
5HJLRQDOLVPDQGWKH:721HZ5XOHVIRUWKH*DPH"
,QWURGXFWLRQ
  Regionalism is back. After a long hiatus, regional integration agreements have become much
more popular in recent years. Of the 91 active agreements in the WTO, 52 have been notified
since 1992. Furthermore, regionalism is no longer mainly confined to Europe. Customs
unions and free-trade areas (FTAs) are now springing up outside Europe with much greater
frequency than for many years.
1 At present, all WTO members apart from Japan, the Republic
of Korea and Hong Kong China are parties to at least one regional arrangement.
 
  Regionalism and multilateralism are often presented as complementary approaches. The
resurgence of regionalism has nevertheless been accompanied by a concern that trading
agreements between the few might undermine the benefits which the multilateral system is
supposed to deliver to the many. Much of this concern stems from the long-held view that the
rules governing regional arrangements are inadequate.
2 Article XXIV of the GATT, which is
the legal basis for the most important regional arrangements in the WTO, is meant to ensure
that such schemes facilitate trade between their members without raising barriers to trade with
third countries.
3 However, there are a number of points on which Article XXIV is less than
completely clear. For example, when a FTA is created, the member countries are required not
to raise DSSOLFDEOH tariffs on imports from third countries. It is not clear whether this term
refers to bound tariffs (ceilings) or to actually applied rates. Article XXIV also requires the
members countries of customs unions and FTAs to liberalize VXEVWDQWLDOO\ DOO WKH WUDGH
between themselves, but again it is not clear exactly what this means.
 
  The key ambiguities in Article XXIV, and the difficulties involved in reaching a consensus
among GATT/WTO members, have meant that only one arrangement has ever been found to
be GATT- or WTO-consistent, whereas no agreement has ever been ruled incompatible. It
seems that the question is not so much whether the WTO needs clearer rules on regional
arrangements, but whether WTO members are prepared to adopt them. In any game, the rules
are more likely to be changed when the changes are in the perceived interests of the major
players. As the world’s major trading power, the EU has both a specific interest in securing
                                               
1 To be sure, regional arrangements outside Europe were also popular in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the developing
world. See Bhagwati (1993) for a discussion of why this so-called First Regionalism failed to endure, and why the Second
Regionalism is more likely to do so.
2 See Jackson (1969) and Dam (1970) for early discussions of some of the problems posed by the GATT system. More recent
contributions include those of Finger (1993), Snape (1993), and the various writings of Bhagwati cited at the end of this paper.4
access to third country markets and a general interest in a strong, rules-based multilateral
system. However, it also maintains a complex set of trading arrangements with third
countries.
4 It is, in effect, the main “user” of Article XXIV. Clearer rules could improve the
legal certainty of the EU’s own agreements within the WTO, but rules which are too strict
could cause problems for the EU and its partners. Obviously, a balance needs to be struck
between these different interests. Box 1 shows how this balance has shifted over the years,
with the EU moving from a somewhat defensive stance on Article XXIV to its current
position of supporting clarification of “areas of long-standing difficulty”.
5
 
  This paper is written from an EU perspective. It argues that there should be two priorities for
the EU in any future negotiations on Article XXIV. Firstly, it should seek to harmonize the
rules on FTAs and customs unions in relation to their obligations not to raise tariffs on third-
country imports. Given the current ambiguity over the meaning of “applicable” tariffs,
Mexico was able to raise some 500 applied tariffs on imports from third countries (including
the EU) in response to the 1994/95 peso crisis, albeit within bound ceilings. At the same time,
Mexico lowered tariffs on imports from the US and Canada under the NAFTA agreement.
Such a strategy is hardly compatible with the “spirit” of Article XXIV – that barriers to trade
with third countries must not be raised. However, the current rules are so ambiguous that it is
unclear whether they have been broken. Secondly, the EU and other WTO members need to
address the problem of different rules of origin emerging from different regional
arrangements. With the proliferation of FTAs in recent years, a serious problem has arisen
because of non-overlapping, and perhaps protection-accommodating, preferential rules of
origin. Recent moves by the EU and its partners in European agreements to establish diagonal
cumulation of origin offer a blueprint for other countries to follow, but the ultimate objective
should be the adoption either of a single set of origin rules for all agreements or an
international standard to which different rules should conform.
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a short history of Article
XXIV, whilst Section 3 provides a brief summary of the economic issues which it raises. The
three key ambiguities in Article XXIV are examined in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
clarification of Article XXIV, and the paper’s conclusions are presented in Section 6.
                                                                                                                                      
3 Article XXIV applies to trade in goods. Article V of the GATS is the equivalent as far as trade in services is concerned. Some
regional arrangements involving developing countries are notified under the so-called “Enabling Clause” (see below).
4 This is described in Sapir (1998).
5 “WTO Aspects of EU’s Preferential Trade Agreements with Third Countries”, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the  European Parliament, SEC(96), 2168 final, 16 January 1997.5
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  It should be recognized that many of the problems with Article XXIV were first brought to light when the customs
union provisions of the Treaty of Rome were themselves examined within the GATT or when subsequent
enlargements of the EU took place. (The Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
was granted a waiver under Article XXIV.) Countries which were third parties to European integration complained
when they perceived their interests to be adversely affected by these developments, but relatively weak
enforcement under the GATT and the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement between all GATT members,
meant that the problems were never satisfactorily resolved.
6
 
  The EU has traditionally taken a somewhat defensive position on Article XXIV. Consider, for example, the issue
of whether the external requirements on regional arrangements concerning their DSSOLFDEOHWDULIIV should apply to
bound rates or to applied rates. In 1961, the EU took the view that “the expression ‘applicable’ must be read, in
contrast to the term ‘imposed’ used elsewhere in Article XXIV, as referring to a rule of law which is applied or
FDSDEOHRIEHLQJDSSOLHG, and that LWLVIRUHDFKFRQWUDFWLQJSDUW\FRQVWLWXWLQJDFXVWRPVXQLRQRUDIUHHWUDGHDUHD
WRLQWHUSUHWLWVRZQOHJLVODWLRQZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHGXWLHVZKLFKVKRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVEHLQJDSSOLFDEOH´ [emphasis
added].
7
 
Today, with regional integration schemes spreading outside Europe, the EU is increasingly in the position of being
a third party to other countries’ regionalism. When other countries exploit ambiguities in the rules governing such
schemes, this can be detrimental to EU interests. For example, EU trade with Mexico was adversely affected by
the latter’s decision to raise more than 500 applied tariffs on imports from non-preferential partners in response to
the 1994/95 peso crisis, whilst at the same time lowering tariffs on imports from the US and Canada under the
NAFTA agreement. This situation could arise again several-fold in the FTAA process. Chile, for example, has a
uniform DSSOLHG tariff of 11 per cent, whilst its ERXQG rate is generally 25 per cent.
In 1997, the European Commission adopted a Communication entitled, “WTO Aspects of EU’s Preferential Trade
Agreements with Third Countries”. The Communication identified a number of “areas of long-standing difficulty”
in the rules on regional arrangements and stated that “the fact that a number of our trading partners are themselves
likely to put preferential agreements in place is a cause for concern, given the uncertainties identified in respect of
Article XXIV”.
A number of other WTO members apparently share the EU’s concerns. At the first WTO Ministerial Conference
held in Singapore, in December 1996, several WTO members expressed their support for a clarification of Article
XXIV. The Ministerial declaration stated that “the expansion and extent of regional trade arrangements make it
important to analyze whether the system of WTO rights and obligations as it relates to regional trade arrangements
needs to be further clarified.”
                                               
6 Jackson (1969) has argued that the accommodation of the EEC within the GATT in disregard of the legal requirements of
Article XXIV was itself the beginning of the breakdown of the GATT’s legal discipline. This accommodation partly reflects the
strategic interests of the EU’s transatlantic partners in supporting economic integration in Western Europe as a way of containing
the Soviet threat.
7 Report of the Tariff Negotiations Committee in 1961, quoted in WTO (1995), p805.6
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  GATT Article XXIV is an exception to the most-favoured nation (MFN) rule of Article I,
which prescribes non-discrimination as a basic principle of trade policy. MFN clauses in trade
agreements can apparently be traced back at least seven hundred years.
8 Article XXIV, on the
other hand, is essentially a product of the wartime negotiations between the United States and
the United Kingdom. The main point of dispute in these negotiations was the latter’s imperial
(later, commonwealth) preference scheme. There were two main aspects to this dispute.
Firstly, whereas imperial preferences within a common sovereignty were generally accepted,
preferences between autonomous countries of the British Commonwealth were not. However,
as a compromise, specific and limited exceptions to Article I were allowed to be
“grandfathered”, with Article XXIV applying beyond them. Secondly, the US opposed the
use of less-than-100 per cent preferences, but favoured customs unions in which the member
countries removed completely the barriers to intra-union trade. The latter were regarded as
“conducive to the expansion of trade on the basis of multilateralism and non-discrimination”
9,
whereas less-than-100 per cent preferences were not.
 
  The US proposals of September 1946, which formed the basis of negotiations for a possible
International Trade Organization (ITO), were therefore based on the general rule of MFN
treatment, with exceptions allowed for 100 per cent preferences. However, these proposals
differed in several important respects from the provisions which were finally settled in the
Havana Charter, negotiated between November 1947 and March 1948. For example, whereas
the US proposals allowed for customs unions, no mention was made of FTAs. In fact, FTAs
were only added to the Havana Charter on a motion from Lebanon and Syria.
10 The ITO, of
course, never saw the light of day and the eventual GATT agreement was only applied
“provisionally” by its contracting parties (until the formation of the WTO).
 
  It is worth noting that the GATT agreement also differs in several respects from the Havana
Charter. For example, the latter contained a provision for preferential arrangements (limited
to not more than fifteen years) in special circumstances between customs territories which
were contiguous or in the same economic region, provided they received the approval of two-
thirds of the members of the ITO. This provision did not appear in the GATT text.
 
                                               
8 Jackson (1989), p133.
9 The words are those of a prominent US official of the time, quoted in Bhagwati (1991), p65.
10 It is perhaps ironic that neither of these countries is a current WTO member. Those countries which are WTO members, on the
other hand, have made much greater use of FTAs than customs unions.7
  The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which was concluded in 1979, created an
additional exception to Article I. The so-called “Enabling Clause”, more properly referred to
as the “GATT Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries of 28 November 1979”, established a separate
legal basis for preferences for and between developing countries. In effect, the requirements
on developing countries are substantially weaker than those for developed countries, and it
has even been suggested that they “can more or less do whatever they want to do with respect
to preferences for each other, unconstrained by Articles I and XXIV”.
11 This probably
explains why the US tried in 1992 to have the MERCOSUR agreement notified under Article
XXIV rather than the Enabling Clause. These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, although
the MERCOSUR countries have since agreed to an examination of their agreement under
Article XXIV as well as to compensation negotiations (under paragraph 6 of Article XXIV)
resulting from the formation of the MERCOSUR common external tariff.
 
  The Uruguay Round, which was concluded in 1994, has had three important consequences for
regional arrangements. Firstly, it led to the adoption of the “Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”, which
is part of the founding documents of the WTO. This understanding attempts to clarify some of
the criteria and procedures for assessing agreements notified under Article XXIV as well as to
improve the transparency of all such agreements. It does go a long way towards solving some
of the previous problems. For example, it provides a framework for assessing the impact of
customs unions on third countries. However, as we shall see, it does not by any means solve
all of the problems. Secondly, the Uruguay Round also gave birth to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). Article V of the GATS is the equivalent of Article XXIV of the
GATT as far as services are concerned. Finally, one should note the establishment, at the
beginning of 1996, of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). The main task
of the CRTA is to assess the compatibility of FTAs and customs unions with the provisions of
the GATT and the GATS. Since there is an important backlog of notified but unexamined
agreements, the CRTA will have its work cut out. It also has a mandate to examine systemic
issues, but as yet, it is too early to judge how successful it will be in this respect.
12
                                               
11 Snape (1993), p285. The principle of “Differential and More Favourable Treatment” for developing countries is in contrast to
the recent strategy of some developing countries to “lock-in” reforms through Article XXIV-sanctioned regional arrangements
with developed countries. Examples include Mexico under NAFTA, and the Europe Agreements negotiated between the EU and
the Central and Eastern European countries. Another problem with the Enabling Clause is that it is not clear which WTO
members should be allowed to claim the status of a developing country. In the absence of  explicit criteria, this is currently
decided on the basis of self-selection.
12 Future work on systemic issues in the CRTA will include the question of whether the WTO rules on regional arrangements
need to be further clarified.8
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It is often asserted that the free-rider problem can create difficulties in sustaining the impetus
of multilateral trade liberalization when pursued on a purely MFN basis.
13 Regionalism can
provide a way out of this impasse. If we allow for the possibility that a group of countries
may find it more feasible to pursue mutual liberalization between themselves, perhaps as part
of an ongoing process of political integration as in the EU case, then some sort of exception to
the MFN clause is required. But the GATT is a  pragmatic document, and Article XXIV is
less a solution to the free-rider problem than a recognition of the fact that regional integration
between groups of countries is a political reality. What, then, are the economic consequences
of allowing countries to form regional arrangements?
When Article XXIV was written, the view among the majority of economists seems to have
been that, since free trade maximizes welfare whilst tariffs and other distortions reduce it, an
agreement which eliminates tariffs between a group of countries and does not raise barriers to
trade with third countries must increase welfare even if it does not maximize it. The problem
with this is that, whereas a regional arrangement removes distortions between the relative
price of domestic goods and partner-country goods, it LQWURGXFHV another distortion between
the relative price of goods which originate within the arrangement and those from outside.
Applying Jacob Viner’s concepts of trade creation and trade diversion (which are a particular
instance of the general theory of second best), we know that the welfare consequences of
pursuing such policies are ambiguous since it is unclear which effect will dominate.
What should be clear is that Article XXIV is not about distinguishing between trade-creating
and trade-diverting arrangements. This is because GATT pre-dates Viner, whose book, 7KH
&XVWRP8QLRQ,VVXH, was only published in 1950. As Finger (1993) points out, Article XXIV
is not designed to isolate economically sensible departures from non-discrimination. It should
instead be regarded as another example of the GATT-standard ‘\HVEXW’ rule. In this case,
discrimination is allowed, “but only when there is big-time discrimination: the countries who
discriminate in favour of one another must HOLPLQDWH (not just reduce) DOO restrictions on
VXEVWDQWLDOO\DOO the trade among themselves.”
14 In other words, Article XXIV imposes a cost
to pursuing discrimination as an instrument of everyday commercial policy (for example,
discrimination must be extended to “substantially all the trade”, and cannot involve less-than-
                                               
13 For example, Caplin and Krishna (1988) have developed a formal model in which the (unconditional) MFN requirement that
each country in a bilateral negotiation also lower its tariffs on countries which are not involved in the bargain creates an
externality which is cannot be internalized in a bilateral bargain. As a result, a simultaneous round of bilateral negotiations under
MFN rules may be less effective at lowering tariffs than would be the case if MFN treatment were not required.
14 Finger (1993), p134.9
100 per cent preferences). The underlying rationale seems to be that only those countries
which are serious about discrimination, e.g. those with an ulterior political objective for
integration, are likely to find that the benefits of integration meet this cost. Politics is
important, and the GATT, as a pragmatic document, seems to recognize this.
Although “economic theory certainly does QRW come down wholly against preferential
reductions of trade barriers” (Bhagwati, 1990, p1306), the fact remains that the first best
policy is always to remove DOO distortions. So, the first-best Article XXIV is no Article XXIV,
and the various options for reforming it are really just exercises in the theory of the second
best. It is, therefore, perhaps salutary that the debate amongst economists has focused on the
larger issues, rather than on what should be in a revised article in a legal text. One of these
larger issues is the question of what would happen to world welfare if the world economy
were to fragment into, say, three trading blocs. Box 2 summarizes the findings of the most
well known economic model, due to Paul Krugman, and looks at some of the criticisms which
have been directed against it. Another larger issue is whether regional arrangements help or
hinder greater multilateral liberalization. In the words of Jagdish Bhagwati, are they likely to
be “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs”? This issue is explored in Box 3.
Even if we accept pessimistic answers to both of these questions, it must be recognized that
most countries are still unwilling to accept the first best solution of removing all distortions.
This leaves us with the various second best options, at least for the moment. One rather
pragmatic solution is for countries to follow what has been called “open regionalism”. This
concept has not been precisely defined, but two ideas are usually associated with it. The first
is that the privileges granted by countries to each other in a regional arrangement should be
extended at a similar pace to other WTO members without full reciprocity. The second is that
regional arrangements must be open to any country which wishes to join. Because of the
political difficulties involved in accepting new members to existing blocs, Bhagwati (1997)
suggests that “open regionalism is likely to prove a detour rather than a staging post on the
path to liberal trade.”
15 Open regionalism could still prove useful where it is feasible, but a
reform of Article XXIV seems to be a more direct way to solve some of the main outstanding
problems. The next section explores some of them.
                                               
15 Bhagwati (1997), p24. He then goes on: “I recall a meeting in Tokyo some years ago, when a Brazilian diplomat announced
proudly that Mercosur practised open regionalism. This prompted a mischievous official from Hong Kong to walk up to the stage
and say: ‘Here is Hong Kong’s application. When can we start?’. No answer as yet.”10
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  A danger with the growth in importance of regional trading blocs is that the world economy could become
fragmented. A particular fear seems to be that three trading blocs could emerge. The first would be in Europe,
centred on the EU, the second in the Americas centred on the US, and the third in Pacific Asia, perhaps centred on
Japan (see, for example, Thurow, 1992). What are the implications of such developments for world welfare? The
most well known model of regional trading blocs is due to Paul Krugman (1991a), in which there are a large
number of identical countries and one differentiated product. Each country specializes in the production of a single
variety of this product, but households consume all varieties. If countries form into trading blocs and a tariff is
levied on imports from all countries outside the bloc, this model suggests that world welfare is maximized when
the number of blocs is either one or very large. If there is only one bloc in the world, then this is equivalent to
multilateral free trade. If the number of blocs is large, then the RSWLPDOWDULII(the tariff which will maximize bloc
welfare given the tariff charged elsewhere in the world) is near zero. This is because each bloc accounts for only a
small share in the other blocs’ consumption, so it will have minimal market power. If the number of blocs is above
zero but still small, on the other hand, each bloc will account for a larger share in the consumption of the others,
thus granting it greater market power and raising the optimum tariff. Furthermore, the elimination of intra-bloc
tariffs will introduce more distortions than it eliminates. Krugman suggests that the worst case scenario for world
welfare arises when the number of blocs is indeed three.
 
  There are, of course, a number of assumptions in the Krugman model. Firstly, trading blocs are assumed to set
tariffs in order to improve their terms-of-trade (the ratio of export prices to import prices). More precisely, blocs
are assumed to engage in optimal-tariff setting, i.e. they choose their tariffs so that the marginal gain from
improved terms of trade just offsets the marginal loss from decreased specialization and exchange resulting from
reduced trade. In theory, however, Article XXIV prevents blocs (or, at least, customs unions) from behaving in this
manner. Krugman (1993) has extended his original model to relax the assumption of optimal-tariff setting. He
shows that the original result still holds, i.e. world welfare is generally minimized when there are three blocs.
 
  Secondly, the model ignores transport costs. Krugman (1991b) himself recognized, however, that if trade blocs
form on a continental basis and inter-continental transport costs are prohibitively high, a series of regional blocs
each covering one continent will produce the same outcome as would have occurred under global free trade. In
other words, when inter-continental transport costs are prohibitive, regionalism can be benign if blocs are formed
along continental lines. Krugman distinguishes such “natural” continental blocs from “unnatural” inter-continental
blocs. With non-prohibitive inter-continental transport costs, the implications of regionalism for world welfare are
less clear-cut. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1994) show that even “natural” blocs can be welfare-reducing for certain
values of inter-continental transport costs. They call such welfare-reducing blocs, “super-natural”.
 
  Finally, the Krugman model relies on the assumption of symmetry, a point which has been heavily criticized.
Srinivasan (1993), for example, has shown that if one allows for asymmetric blocs, there is no clear relationship
between the number of blocs and world welfare. The problem is that the production structure in the Krugman
model contains no element of comparative advantage, but is instead based exclusively on trade in differentiated
products (i.e. products which are identical in all respects except for country of production are considered to be
imperfect substitutes), with households consuming all varieties. Deardorff and Stern (1992) suggest that, since the
Krugman model involves each country importing goods from every other country in the world, the likelihood of
trade diversion is increased, which results in an overly pessimistic view of regionalism.11
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  A second question which economists have raised is whether the growth of regionalism is more or less likely to lead
to eventual multilateral free trade: are regional arrangements “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs”? One way to
answer this question is to ask how bloc formation and expansion can alter the incentives of different countries to
pursue multilateral liberalization.
 
  Baldwin (1995) argues that the formation of a bloc can have a “domino effect”. In his model, excluded countries
will choose to remain outside the bloc if, at the margin, the gains from membership do not outweigh the costs. As
regional integration increases (as the bloc expands in membership, or as integration between bloc members
deepens), the incentives for excluded countries at the margin will be altered. Imperfectly competitive firms in the
excluded countries will lose competitiveness compared to firms inside the bloc. The countries closest to the margin
will then seek to join the bloc. If they do so, the costs of non-membership for countries at the next margin will also
rise and they will, in turn, also seek to join the bloc. This is an analysis of the incentives of non-members, or what
has been termed the GHPDQGfor bloc membership. Of course, “insiders” will always need a set of “outsiders” to
exploit, so they may have an incentive to veto bloc expansion. In other words, the VXSSO\ of bloc membership also
needs to be considered.
 
  Krishna (1993) and Levy (1994) tackle exactly this issue by looking at the incentives of “insiders”. Krishna’s
model has three countries, each with segmented, imperfectly competitive markets. Government policy is
determined solely by its effect on profits, with producers playing a decisive role in shaping trade policy.
Multilateral free trade is feasible from this starting point. However, two of the countries will have an incentive to
create a bloc between themselves, with this incentive being greater the more likely the bloc is to be trade diverting.
This is because when two countries form a bloc, firms in each country will gain increased access to the other’s
market but will lose protection against partner country firms. So, the more the bloc involves trade being diverted
away from firms in the rest of the world, the more likely it is that it will lead to gains for the two partner countries’
firms for a given loss of protection in their own domestic markets. Once such a bloc has been formed, however, its
incentive to liberalize trade with the rest of the world will be reduced. Krishna shows that with sufficient trade
diversion, this incentive could be so reduced as to make subsequent multilateral liberalization impossible.
Regionalism, in this admittedly simple model, may therefore be a “stumbling bloc”, since the “insiders” have an
incentive not to expand the bloc.
 
  Levy reaches similar conclusions by considering the effects of different trade negotiations on the welfare of the
median voter. Trade liberalization involves both “politically difficult” redistribution effects (typically when trade
takes place between countries which are dissimilar) and “politically easy” variety and scale-economy effects
(which typically arise when trade takes place between similar countries). If, in the absence of a bilateral agreement
between two similarly endowed countries, the median voters in each would only marginally prefer multilateral
liberalization to the status quo, then this must reflect the near balance of these two effects. Since scale-economy
and variety effects typically benefit all voters, including the median voter, this implies that redistribution effects
are detrimental to the median voter. Now assume that a bilateral bargain between these two similar countries can
be concluded, so that the median voter in each can gain from “politically easy” effects without suffering any
“politically difficult” ones. Such a deal must undermine support for further multilateral liberalization including vis-
à-vis dissimilar countries, since now the gains for the median voter from scale economy and variety effects are that
much smaller whilst losses from redistribution effects remain.12
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According to paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, “the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade
area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to
the trade of other [countries] with such territories”. There are two parts to this general
requirement:
q  regional arrangements must not raise barriers to trade with third countries – the
provisions of  paragraph 5 of Article XXIV are intended to protect the interests of third
countries when a group of WTO members form a regional arrangement among
themselves. The requirement is that the tariffs DSSOLFDEOH on imports from third countries
must not be raised or made more restrictive. A similar provision applies to RWKHU
UHJXODWLRQVRIFRPPHUFH.
q  regional arrangements must facilitate trade between their members – paragraph 8 of
Article XXIV requires that tariffs and other restrictive regulations of commerce on
VXEVWDQWLDOO\DOOWKHWUDGH between the members countries be abolished. The arrangement
must meet this second test if it is to benefit from the general derogation from the rule of
non-discrimination in GATT Article I.
We will now briefly examine some of the main ambiguities in these provisions.
³DSSOLFDEOH´WDULIIV
  Article XXIV attempts to safeguard the interests of outsiders to a regional arrangement by
requiring countries which form a customs union or FTA not to raise the tariffs which are
DSSOLFDEOHon imports from third countries. The interpretation of the word “applicable” is one
of the most serious ambiguities in Article XXIV. The ambiguity arises because of the
distinction between ERXQGtariff rates and DSSOLHG tariff rates. In the WTO, countries make
commitments to bind their tariff rates at some level. They can break these commitments (i.e.
raise a tariff above a bound rate), but only with difficulty. To do so, they must negotiate with
the countries most concerned, which may result in compensation for loss of trade incurred by
trading partners.
 
  For developed countries, bound rates are now generally the same as the tariffs which are
actually applied. For developing countries, although there was a considerable increase in the
number of product lines subject to bound tariffs as a result of the Uruguay Round (from 21
per cent to 73 per cent), bound rates tend to be somewhat higher than the actual rates charged.
The bound rates therefore serve as “ceilings”. Now the question arises whether the restrictions13
on countries in FTAs not to raise DSSOLFDEOHtariffs on third-country imports refers to actually
applied rates or to bound ceilings.
 
  In 1995, as a reaction to the peso crisis, Mexico raised more than 500 applied tariffs on items
such as textiles, clothing and footwear within bound ceilings. The tariff increases only applied
to imports from non-preferential partners. Tariffs on imports from other NAFTA countries
were not affected. Indeed, Mexico continued to eliminate progressively tariffs on imports
from the US as required under NAFTA’s tariff elimination provisions. It is perhaps useful to
look at what happened to trade flows after these tariff changes. The clothing sector may be a
useful case to consider.
16 The table below shows the evolution of exports of clothing from the
US, the EU and the rest of the world to Mexico over the period 1994 to 1996. Over this
period, Mexican tariffs on imports of clothing from non-NAFTA partners were raised from 20
per cent to 35 per cent, whilst tariffs on imports from the US continued to be progressively
eliminated according to the relevant provisions of the NAFTA agreement.
17 If US exports of
clothing to Mexico displaced exports of other countries over this period, this may be
suggestive of trade diversion.
 
  The table shows that over this period, US exports of clothing increased by 47 per cent, from
$1,160 million to $1,700. On the other hand, EU exports fell by 55 per cent, whilst exports
from the rest of the world fell by 71. The share of the US in the world’s exports to Mexico
increased from 76 per cent in 1994 to 93 per cent in 1996.
 
  7DEOH([SRUWVRIFORWKLQJWR0H[LFRIURPWKH86WKH(8DQGWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG
  0LOOLRQVRI86
  ([SRUWLQJFRXQWU\         
       US   1,159   1,370   1,698
       EU-15   106   59   48
       Rest of the world   254   106   73
       US as % of total   76%   89%   93%
  Source: UN COMTRADE and EU COMEXT statistics
 
  Whilst this does not establish conclusively that trade diversion has occurred, the fact that US
exports increasedand exports from the rest of the world fell after Mexico raised tariffs on
                                               
16 In fact, the analysis of the clothing sector is complicated by the fact that the NAFTA countries also adopted more restrictive
rules of origin. This is discussed below.
17 Some items from the US already entered free of Mexican tariffs at the beginning of 1994. Tariffs on remaining items are being
progressively eliminated according to various schedules lasting up to 2003.14
non-NAFTA imports does give rise to strong suspicions. It should be noted that this problem
could occur several times over if a Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is created. The
developing countries of Central and Southern America tend to have tariff ceilings which are
above their actually applied rates. Even Chile, which is often cited as an example of a
developing country with a liberal and transparent trading regime, has an applied tariff of 11
per cent but tariff ceilings of 25 per cent for most goods and 31.5 per cent for some
agricultural goods. Upon joining a future FTAA, Chile could lower tariffs from 11 per cent to
zero on imports from other American countries and at the same time, raise them on other non-
preferential countries to 25 or 31.5 per cent. Because of the ambiguous way in which Article
XXIV is drafted, Chile could argue that this tariff escalation was WTO-consistent.
 
  Historically, the ambiguity concerning the word “applicable” has affected both customs
unions and FTAs. The external obligations on customs unions, in Article XXIV(5)(a), are
worded in a similar manner to those on FTAs, in Article XXIV(5)(b). Indeed, the EU has in
the past exploited this ambiguity itself. The calculation of the common external tariff of the
original six members of the EEC customs union used the Italian bound tariff even though this
rate had never been applied. In relation to customs unions, however, a key clarification has
now been introduced by the Uruguay Round Understanding. This states that the overall
assessment of customs unions shall be based on the  DSSOLHG rates of duty.
18 This clarification
was introduced in order to ensure that calculations of compensation for third countries are
based on the rates of duty actually applied by the customs union. However, whilst the
clarification is to be welcomed, there is now a discrepancy between the rules on customs
unions and those on free-trade areas. The legal situation of a country which joins a FTA and
raises the tariffs it applies on imports from third countries (within bound ceilings) is
ambiguous.
 
  Once could argue that the term “applicable” must logically refer to DSSOLHG tariffs, since
bound tariffs are not meant to be raised in any event (regardless of whether or not a country
decides to discriminate in its trade policy by forming an Article XXIV regional arrangement).
On the other hand, this interpretation creates a difficulty over the legal status of tariff
bindings. In effect, membership of a regional arrangement implies that a country’s applied
tariff will become its bound tariff. There is therefore a danger that countries with large
                                               
18 The requirement in paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV is that the trade barriers created by a customs union “shall not on the whole
be higher or more restrictive” than was the case prior to the formation of the customs union. However, a key problem was that
Article XXIV neither provided nor excluded any methodology for determining how the external effects of customs unions should
be assessed. It was only with the adoption of the Uruguay Round Understanding that a specific methodological framework was
introduced.15
differences between applied and bound tariffs, i.e. developing countries, could anticipate a
tightening of the rules on what constitutes an “applicable” tariff, and raise applied tariffs on
imports from non-preferential partners within bound ceilings. This would be contrary to the
spirit of ongoing multilateral liberalization.
³VXEVWDQWLDOO\DOOWKHWUDGH´
  Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV provides that customs unions and FTAs must liberalize
“substantially all the trade” between their members. The implication is that an agreement
which does not provide for the abolition of barriers to  VXEVWDQWLDOO\DOOWKHWUDGH between the
member countries does not qualify as WTO-consistent and is therefore not a valid exemption
from the general principle of non-discrimination which is contained in GATT Article I.
19
 
  As we have seen, the rationale for the requirement that countries in a regional arrangement
liberalize substantially all the trade between themselves is probably to prevent discrimination
from becoming a tool of day-to-day commercial policy. However, the ambiguous nature of
the phrase “substantially all the trade” may have been the result of a deliberate decision to
grant countries a certain degree of latitude with respect to the removal of trade barriers on
individual products. The drafting history of Article XXIV shows that it “had been drafted
against the background of the possibility of a free-trade area being established in Europe in
which the United Kingdom, in particular, might wish to retain some barriers against certain
imports from its partners mainly as a result of its [imperial] preferential arrangements”.
20
Furthermore, it appears that the latitude granted to countries by the phrase “substantially all
the trade” was intended to be used with respect to  DJULFXOWXUDO products in particular. It was
for this reason that the original EFTA countries argued that the exclusion of the agricultural
sector from the free-trade provisions of the EFTA agreement should be regarded as consistent
with paragraph 8 of Article XXIV.
Whilst a specific provision for the exclusion of the agricultural sector may have been
considered desirable by some countries at the time the GATT was drafted, there is less reason
for maintaining such a provision today. Considerable progress was made in the Uruguay
Round in extending GATT discipline to agriculture, and further multilateral negotiations on
this topic are due to begin after 1999. In addition, the Uruguay Round Understanding on
Article XXIV seems to echo the sentiment that allowing specific sectoral exclusions from the
                                               
19 Article V of the GATS, which is the equivalent for trade in services of Article XXIV of the GATT, contains, if anything, a
somewhat weaker requirement that a services FTA or customs union should have “VXEVWDQWLDO￿VHFWRUDO￿FRYHUDJH”.
20 Report of the GATT Working Party on the “European Free-Trade Area - Examination of the Stockholm Convention”, quoted
in WTO (1995), p825.16
liberalization provisions of regional arrangements is no longer appropriate. In the preamble to
the Understanding, WTO members recognized the contribution to the expansion of world
trade that may be made by closer integration between countries which form regional
arrangements, but stated that “such contribution is increased if the elimination between the
constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to DOO
WUDGH, and diminished if any major sector is excluded”. The key question, then, is whether
WTO members are willing to extend free trade in agriculture to regional partner countries.
³RWKHU>UHVWULFWLYH@UHJXODWLRQVRIFRPPHUFH´
The treatment of preferential rules of origin in Article XXIV is the third key ambiguity which
needs to be considered. According to paragraph 5(b) of Article XXIV, which sets out the
external obligations of free-trade areas, “the duties and other regulations of commerce”
applied to trade with third parties “shall not be higher or more restrictive” than before the
FTA was formed. Similarly, paragraph 8 (b), which sets out the internal requirements which
FTAs must fulfil, requires “the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” to be
eliminated on trade between member countries. A key problem, which has never been
satisfactorily resolved, is whether the phrase “other [restrictive] regulations of commerce”
includes preferential rules of origin. Preferential rules of origin are used to determine whether
preferential, generally zero, rates of duty should be applied to a given product. FTAs require
preferential rules of origin because with different national tariff rates on third-country imports
there would otherwise be a problem of trade deflection (imports ultimately destined for high-
tariff countries would enter via low-tariff countries to avoid these high tariffs).
If rules of origin are included in “other regulations of commerce” then preferential rules of
origin cannot, in principle, be more restrictive than the ordinary rules of origin which are used
to determine whether the MFN rate of duty should be applied. Preferential rules of origin
under FTAs are, however, frequently more complicated than ordinary rules of origin. There is
a legitimate reason for this: customs authorities must satisfy themselves that there is no
fraudulent abuse of preferential duties and that only goods originating in preferential partner
countries are allowed preferential tariff treatment. However, there is also a danger that  PRUH
FRPSOLFDWHG can also mean PRUHUHVWULFWLYH: rules of origin that are too restrictive can become
a barrier to trade both between the parties to a regional arrangement and between those
countries and the rest of the world. With the proliferation of FTAs in recent years has come a
growing concern about non-overlapping, increasingly complex and, perhaps, protection-
accommodating preferential rules of origin.17
In some cases, preferential rules of origin seem designed to IUXVWUDWH rather than IDFLOLWDWH
trade between the parties to the agreement. For example, under the CUSFTA (the free-trade
agreement between Canada and the US, which preceded the NAFTA), there was a rule that
the production of aged cheese from used milk did not confer origin on the country where the
cheese was made if it was different from the country where the milk was produced. It has
been suggested that this rule reflected a covenant by the US and Canadian dairy industries not
to compete in each other’s market.
21
There are also examples of preferential rules of origin which effectively raise new trade
barriers against third countries. Perhaps the most infamous example is NAFTA’s “yarn
forward” rule, under which the US only grants duty-free treatment to Mexican garments if the
yarn is made, the cloth woven and all cutting and sewing is done in North America. One critic
of this rule of origin pointed out that “this makes as much sense as forcing Belgian companies
to use American sugar for their chocolate exports”.
22
Preferential rules of origin which frustrate the possibilities for trade between countries in a
regional arrangement, or which effectively raise new barriers to trade with third countries,
clearly violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Article XXIV. As such, one can argue that they
pose a threat to the cohesion of the multilateral system. However, since there is no agreement
on whether preferential rules of origin are included in the definition of “other regulations of
commerce”, little has been done to address this issue. In the Uruguay Round, the WTO
members did reach an agreement which aims at the long-term harmonization of rules of
origin, supervised by a new Committee on Rules of Origin. This agreement aims to make
rules of origin objective, understandable and predictable. Until the completion of the
harmonization programme, contracting parties are expected to ensure that their rules of origin
are transparent; and that they do not have restricting, distorting or disruptive effects.
However, the agreement specifically excludes rules of origin relating to the granting of tariff
preferences.
23 In other words, preferential rules of origin are not covered.
                                               
21 Palmeter (1993).
22 J. Bovard, “NAFTA’s Protectionist Bent”, :DOO￿6WUHHW￿-RXUQDO, 31 July 1992, p A12, col. 4,  quoted in Palmeter (RS￿￿FLW￿)
footnote 8.
23 The agreement does include an annexe which provides a common understanding on preferential rules of origin. The common
understanding is mainly concerned with ensuring that preferential rules of origin are transparent and not subject to arbitrary
changes. The general question of compatibility of preferential rules of origin with Article XXIV is not addressed.18
&ODULILFDWLRQRI$UWLFOH;;,9
At the second WTO Ministerial Conference held in Geneva, in May 1998, the Ministerial
declaration began with a “tribute to the [multilateral] system’s important contribution over the
past half century to growth, employment and stability”. Multilateralism has survived thus far
because countries have recognized the benefits of a rules-based system based on the general
principle of non-discrimination. At the same time, the actual trade policies of many countries
reveal a growing preference for regionalism. The degree of compatibility between
regionalism and multilateralism continues to divide economists and political commentators,
but there seems to be little disagreement over the fact that the current rules in the WTO are
inadequate. As a recent article in the  )LQDQFLDO7LPHV  noted there is a growing view that “the
time has come to draft tougher WTO disciplines to stop regionalism proliferating endlessly
into the future and threatening the cohesion of the multilateral system”.
24 Given that a re-
wording of Article XXIV, or the establishment of a new Understanding on Interpretation,
could be one of the subjects discussed in the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, it is
important to ask how the EU should proceed and where its priorities should lie.
It should be recognized from the outset that achieving an agreement in a WTO of more than
130 members is likely to be a difficult undertaking. Any proposal for change must therefore
first meet the pragmatic requirement of being broadly acceptable to most WTO members.
25
Furthermore, if new rules are to be adopted, they should permit a simple ex ante judgement to
be formed on whether a particular regional arrangement threatens the cohesion of the
multilateral system.
26 This need for cohesion did not escape those who drafted the original
GATT agreement. Indeed, paragraph 4 of Article XXIV contains an explicit criterion which
could have been used to formulate such a judgement. This is the statement that the purpose of
a customs union or a FTA should be to facilitate trade between member countries and not to
raise barriers to trade with the rest of the world. However, as has been demonstrated, the
language in the remainder of Article XXIV is less than clear in a number of key areas. As a
result, this statement of purpose has not been used as a standard for evaluating regional
arrangements.
                                               
24 Guy de Jonquières, “Blocking moves”, )LQDQFLDO￿7LPHV, supplement ‘The World Trade System at 50’,  page 6, 18 May 1998.
25 Radical proposals, such as Bhagwati’s (1991) suggestion that FTAs should be abolished and only customs unions permitted,
are unlikely to meet this test, whatever their other merits.
26 This suggests that one should rule out proposals such as that  of McMillan (1993), that regional arrangements should be
allowed if the volume of trade with third countries is not adversely affected by their formation. It is difficult to see how this
standard, even if it were to be acceptable, could be used to formulate an ex ante￿judgement. One can also rule out proposals to
introduce WUDGH￿FUHDWLRQ and WUDGH￿GLYHUVLRQ as explicit judgement criteria. Even if cases of trade diversion and trade creation
could be clearly identified, both seem to be compatible with Article XXIV’s criteria for an allowable regional arrangement.19
As we have seen, there are three ambiguities which prevent any clear judgement being formed
on whether a regional arrangement has met the tests which the original framers of Article
XXIV seem to have had in mind. The first ambiguity relates to the external requirements on
regional arrangements and concerns the meaning of an “applicable” tariff. A key priority for
the EU should be to seek a harmonization of the rules on FTAs with those on customs unions.
Countries in FTAs should not be allowed to raise DSSOLHG tariffs on third-country imports,
even if bound tariffs are not affected, without having to compensate trading partners. This
issue needs to be handled with a great deal of care, however, since developing countries with
large differences between applied and bound tariffs may have an incentive to raise the former
within the limits set by the latter in anticipation of a tightening of the rules. This would be
contrary to the spirit of ongoing multilateral liberalization and could result in increased trade
diversion – which is precisely what any clarification of the rules is meant to avoid.
To prevent this sort of situation from arising, there needs to be some degree of  PXOWLODWHUDO
leadership by developed countries which have negotiated regional arrangements with
developing countries. In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean association agreements
(which encompass FTAs between the EU and individual Mediterranean basin countries), the
EU is encouraging regional partners to lower tariffs on imports from third countries in order
to minimize the losses from trade diversion. Such efforts should continue, and the US should
do the same with hemispheric partner countries in any future negotiations on a FTAA (or, at
the least, it should discourage them from raising tariffs on third-country imports).
The second ambiguity is over the meaning of “substantially all the trade” in the required
degree of internal liberalization between countries in regional arrangements. An obvious
solution here would be to remove the word “substantially”. The difficulty with such a
proposal for the EU is, of course, that it would then be required to extend free trade in
agriculture to all preferential partners. If this is the direction in which the common
agricultural policy is to evolve, then the proposal makes sense, at least as a long term solution.
If not, the prospects for the EU adopting such a stance seem less certain. Alternatively, the
EU could favour a clarification which defined exactly what “substantially” should mean.
27 It
could, for example, try to fix a proportion of trade which should be covered.
28 A danger with
                                               
27 At present, there seem to be a number of implicit percentage figures for what “substantially all the trade” could mean.
Bhagwati (1990) suggests that the “percentage cutoff point” which some “skilful lawyers and representatives of governments”
may have in mind could be 75%. There may have been some upgrading of the cutoff since then.
28 In the absence of trade barriers, trade flows in protected sectors might be VXEVWDQWLDOO\ higher. This suggests that any
proportion of trade which should be covered by the word “substantially” should not be based on trade volumes. On the other20
this approach for the EU, is that if it were to attempt to provide a definition or fix a
percentage of trade, then other WTO members might be tempted to press for a tighter
definition or a higher percentage. This could have adverse consequences for the legal
situation of some of the EU’s existing agreements, unless these were to be “grandfathered”.
More importantly, such an approach might provide an incentive for different sectoral interests
within the EU to claim that particular products or areas should be exempted from the
definition of substantially all trade. The effect of lobbying by such protectionist interests
could be to undo in practice the benefits which tightening the rules is supposed to generate in
theory.
The question of whether preferential rules of origin should be included in the definition of
“other [restrictive] regulations of commerce” is also highly problematic. Designing rules
which are simple to administer and relatively inexpensive for firms to comply with, and
which at the same time are neither protectionist nor prone to fraud, is unlikely to be easy.
29
However, the recent adoption of pan-European cumulation suggests a way forward. Under
these arrangements, preferential rules of origin contained in the various Europe Agreements,
concluded between the EU and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have
been aligned with those applied on preferential trade between the EU and the EFTA countries,
and all these countries are now linked through a system of “diagonal” cumulation.
30 This
system allows a manufacturer in the EU to source all material from a CEEC and export the
finished product to, for example, another CEEC or an EFTA country whilst maintaining
preferential origin for tariff purposes. If other countries were to follow this approach, this
would facilitate the eventual adoption of an international standard for preferential rules of
origin. Such a standard would mirror that already agreed in the Uruguay Round for non-
preferential rules of origin, and would aim to make preferential rules of origin objective,
understandable and predictable. Alternatively, WTO members could try to establish a single
set of preferential origin rules which could then be applied to all regional arrangements.
                                                                                                                                      
hand, any proportion based on product coverage will come up against the problem of how products should be defined (e.g. at
what level of statistical disaggregation?).
29 An innovative suggestion has nevertheless been put forward to create a hybrid form of regional arrangement between a
customs union and a FTA. There would be a common external tariff for some items, whilst countries would maintain individual
national tariffs on other items. This would eliminate the need for preferential rules of origin on items where there is a common
tariff. It would also allow a  GH￿PLQLPLV rule to be used where trade deflection is unlikely to be an important problem. For
example, there would be no rules of origin for products where all members adopted a low external tariff. See Wonnacott (1996).
30 The countries concerned are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.21
&RQFOXVLRQV
Regionalism and multilateralism have co-existed throughout the fifty year history of the
GATT/WTO, and will no doubt continue to do so. Nevertheless, the resurgence of
regionalism in recent years does pose problems for the cohesion of the multilateral system.
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the present rules on regional arrangements in
Article XXIV are far from clear.
Article XXIV allows countries to form customs unions and FTAs as a pragmatic exception to
the general principle of non-discrimination in trade policy. It states that the purpose of such
schemes should be to facilitate trade between their members without raising barriers to the
trade of third countries. However, the language in the remainder of Article XXIV is less than
clear on a number of key points. The extent to which regional arrangements should facilitate
trade between their members is not obvious, since Article XXIV requires that liberalization be
extended to “substantially all the trade”. The requirement not to raise barriers to the trade of
third countries is also ambiguously worded. As far as FTAs are unconcerned, it is unclear
whether the rule that “applicable” tariffs must not be raised on third-country imports refers to
bound duty rates or actually applied tariffs. Finally, the provisions relating to preferential
rules of origin are also unclear. These provisions affect both the trade of countries within a
regional arrangement and their trade with outside countries.
This paper has tried to identify some priorities for the EU in any future negotiations on
strengthening WTO disciplines relating to regional schemes. It suggests that the EU should
support a harmonization of the external disciplines on FTAs and customs unions. Countries in
FTAs should be required not to raise the tariffs actually applied on imports from third
countries. In addition, the EU needs to work with other WTO members to strengthen
multilateral disciplines on preferential rules of origin.
 
  Securing agreement among other WTO members for a change in the rules will be a major
undertaking, but there are already indications that a consensus in favour of reform is
emerging.  At the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in December 1996, a
number of WTO countries expressed the view that a change in the rules on regional
arrangements was desirable. A pragmatic approach to resolving some of the key ambiguities
in Article XXIV seems most likely to win the support of other WTO members. To
complement this, the EU should continue to advocate the need for further multilateral
liberalization (through the proposed “Millennium Round”). This would help lower the
discriminatory effects of tariff preferences and reduce the costs which regional arrangements
can impose on the multilateral system.22
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